REFORMING THE UNITED NATIONS
Over the past few years, voices calling for the reform of the United Nations, in particular reform of the Security Council and its membership, have become louder and more persistent. The call for reform is driven by a perception of injustice and absence of democratic principle in a system which vests five nations (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) with the power to veto a resolution, irrespective of the overall support among UN members for that resolution. These five permanent members of the Security Council are, therefore, viewed as exercising an undemocratic influence over the proceedings of the UN.
All but China of the P5 were made permanent Security Council members largely because they were the victors in the Second World War and each possessed nuclear weapons, then the only nuclear-armed states. Since then, China, another nuclear-armed nation, has joined the elite group. Other than the addition of China, the permanent members have remained the same, despite the reduced global role played by the United Kingdom and France and the break-up of the Soviet Union (Russia having inherited the Soviet Union’s seat), and despite other nuclear-armed states coming into being.
The system of five permanent members is viewed by most, including the P5, as inherently unfair. It excludes other economically and militarily influential countries and encourages a sense of disenfranchisement. A number of proposals have been made to change this situation, including expanding the number of permanent members to include, in particular, Brazil, India, Japan and Germany. It has even been suggested that each of these be given a veto, as the existing P5. Whilst going down this route might satisfy the four nations concerned, it is hardly making the system any more democratic. And it risks making it completely unworkable. It would leave many countries feeling distinctly antagonistic to the very idea of their local economic and military rivals becoming so influential. For instance, Pakistan (a populous and nuclear-armed nation) will naturally object to India’s membership. Others will also ask ‘why not us?’ Will not Indonesia feel slighted? What about Turkey? Won’t voices be heard saying that not a single Muslim country will be represented on the revamped permanent veto-wielding membership of the Security Council?
The answer is not really to tinker with the existing system but to devise a wholly different system that will be more democratic but will at the same time recognise that the existing P5 and the aspiring permanent members have a significant role to play and that their power and influence justifies that this role be greater than smaller, less influential countries.
Scheme for Reform
I start from the premise that the very existence of the Security Council brings the UN into disrepute. Privileging a handful of members creates an aristocracy amongst nations and undermines the very principles of democracy. My scheme for reform, therefore, starts with the abolition of the Security Council altogether, using the General Assembly as the world representative body whose resolutions will be binding on all members. Naturally, this means that a new system of voting has to be devised. ‘One-nation-one-vote’ is not a workable alternative to current Security Council arrangements.
In devising a new system, one has to recognise that the existing P5 are there largely because of their influence on the world stage. That power and influence is mainly derived from their economic strength and size of population that allows them to wield both military and economic power. So, any scheme for reform must be realistic and must give the P5 sufficient comfort that they will not lose their influence.
However, any scheme of reform must, to gain general acceptance, be seen to be fair, take account of realities of power (e.g. population and gross domestic product) and not be too rigid. Basing a system simply on voting weighted by, say, population alone will not be desirable. A populous country is often influential, at least regionally, but population alone does not determine global influence. By including GDP (or some other economic parameter that can be independently assessed), a nation’s wealth can be added to the parameters for weighting voting rights. And, whilst GDP is to an extent determine by population, there are sufficient additional influences to conclude that this will not be double-counting. Smaller nations will inevitably score less well though their allocated vote could be affected by, say, a significant discovery of mineral wealth.
Still, I believe this alone is not enough. Nations should be encouraged to improve the lives of their citizens and my proposed scheme for reform of the UN will take into account two further variables. These factors are overall literacy levels and infant mortality.
In the table below, I have calculated the votes that would be attributed, by way of example, to certain countries (those UN members whose names begin with the letter ‘A’). The bases of the weights applied are specified below the table. These are for illustrative purposes only. This weighting system could be tweaked and modified to be made fairer; or other systems could be adopted altogether.
The information source for making the decisions will need to be consistent and adjustments may be needed for lack of data etc. (the information source I have used is the CIA World Factbook). Researches of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, World Bank etc. could be used for providing baseline data.
UNITED NATIONS' MEMBERS
POPULATION GDP LITERACY INFANT MORTALITY
(MILLION), est. (US$ bn) PPP % aged 15 and over LIVE BIRTHS
where <1, 1, rounded up (rounded up) per '000
Afghanistan 34 23 28.10 151.95
Albania 4 22 19.67 18.62
Algeria 34 236 69.90 27.73
Andorra 1 4 100.00 3.76
Angola 13 111 67.40 180.21
Antigua 1 2 85.80 16.25
Argentina 41 576 97.20 11.44
Armenia 3 19 99.40 20.21
Australia 21 801 99.00 4.75
Austria 9 325 98.00 4.42
Azerbaijan 9 74 98.80 54.60
VOTES VOTES VOTES VOTES TOTAL
POPLTN GDP LITERACY INFANT MORT. VOTES
Afghanistan 4 0 0 0 4
Albania 2 0 0 1 3
Algeria 4 1 0 1 6
Andorra 1 0 2 2 5
Angola 3 1 0 0 4
Antigua 1 0 1 1 3
Argentina 4 3 2 2 11
Armenia 1 0 2 1 4
Australia 4 4 2 2 12
Austria 2 2 2 2 8
Azerbaijan 2 1 2 0 5
WEIGHTS
Weights could be adjusted every five years to take account in changes in population, GDP, literacy, infant mortality etc.
POPULATION: less than 3 million: 1
3-10m: 2
10-20m: 3
20-50m: 4
50-100m: 5
100-300m: 6
300-500m: 7
500-800m: 8
800-1,000m: 9
more than 1,000m: 10
GDP:
less than 50bn: 0
50-250bn: 1
250-500bn: 2
500-750bn: 3
750-1,000bn: 4
1,000-2,000bn: 5
more than 2,000bn: 6
LITERACY:
less than 70% 0
70-90% 1
more than 90% 2
INFANT MORTALITY (per ‘000 live births):
more than 50: 0
16-50: 1
less than 16: 2
Conclusion
A glance at the table above reveals that whilst all members will get a minimum of one vote, even the smallest nation, if it has good health and education provision for its people, can increase its vote to five. A larger nation such as Afghanistan, with a moderately-sized population but little in the way of health or education provision scores only 4 votes, compared to Australia’s 12, even though the latter has a population only two-thirds the size of Afghanistan. On this basis (one which, I accept, is not perfect, requires further discussion and could be nuanced in several ways), the maximum vote any country could have is 20.
The system is designed to be fair – it does not allow any one country to dictate policy but it does recognise the reality of power. Importantly, it also encourages members to improve conditions for their citizens in line with the aims of numerous UN agencies.
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