THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

THE FUTURE OF EUROPE: IS THERE ONE?

There are those who see the current economic crisis in Europe as the beginning of the end, first for the euro and then for the grand European idea as a whole. They argue cogently that the Germans will not be willing for long to bail out their southern European partners, unglamorously nicknamed the PIGS - Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain though Italy would do just as well as Ireland and would be more in keeping with the general perception in the north of a corrupt, lazy, and tax averse south. So the argument goes, Germany will tire of these southern debt-ridden sloughs of despond and will either eject them from the eurozone or itself will abandon the euro and return to the glory days of the Deutschmark. France will have to follow the Germans, something it has not been used to doing since the Second World War. Thus an ugly (unworkable?) two-tier Europe will be created (though ignoring the fact that, first, a number of European Union countries, in particular the United Kingdom, have never been in the eurozone; and secondly, talk of a two-tier Europe has existed for well-over a decade when the French thought it was a good idea).

The travails of Europe’s economies have a long way to go and may well cause Germany and others to contemplate taking steps that might irreparably damage the grand European dream. But, in some senses, this crisis might bind Europe more closely together: if the steps taken by the European Central Bank to extend a mountain of credit to Greece (followed by others) work to stem the tide of decline and create a climate for much-needed reform, then Greece and others may well look to Germany as a saviour. But this itself harbours its own dangers. It will make Germany the leader of Europe, a fact the French will not stomach for long.

In reality, the rot set in in 1989. In that year the Berlin wall came down and the following year Germany reunified. The post-war settlement of 1945 was predicated on keeping Germany divided and weak. A strong Germany was seen as a threat to the whole world, not just Europe. This line of thinking went way beyond a desire to punish, to inflict retribution. It was a philosophy based on history, not just the history of the Third Reich but of the German people. The Germanic people had been at the centre of wars in each century for more than half a millennium. This was not so much the fault of the Germans (or at least not entirely) but of their geography. They sat at the heart of Europe and were, therefore, best placed to control large chunks of territory in every direction.

After 1945, with Germany divided and Germans driven out of the eastern bloc, Europe could breathe more easily. The French took the lead. They had always aspired to be leaders of Europe. Napoleon Bonaparte almost achieved it. But, in the last century before 1945, stuck on the periphery of the continent and with a large colonial empire pulling it away from Europe, it struggled for mastery of Europe. In 1945, France saw its chance. With Germany beaten and destitute, France could lead a war-ravaged Europe (or at least the western bit of it). As Germany’s economy picked up, but with the Germans still wary of flexing their burgeoning biceps for fear of reviving memories of wartime horrors and France all too willing to play on these fears, France could both lead politically and could count on Germany to pay for it. France made sure of its pre-eminence by not permitting the United Kingdom to join the European Economic Community in the 1960s. When the UK finally did join, its empire was gone and its economy was in a mess. France could continue to lead without any fear of the UK meddling (especially as it was the new boy on the block).

Then, the wall came down, the two parts of Germany were reunited and the European Union, the transformed economic community, was on an expansionist kick. That expansion moved Germany from being at the periphery of the EU to its very heart. A number of the new members joined which had been historically subject to German influence (Austria, Slovakia etc. and Germany continues to press for the membership of Croatia, another historic ally). So Germany, the economic and industrial powerhouse of Europe, had moved silently into its traditional role as a central European political power. And, with every push that the United States and its NATO allies give to Germany to contribute more to military actions in, for instance, Afghanistan, the quicker it overcomes its taboo over having a stronger more muscular military. What then will be its next step? Britain and France, despite the loss of empire cling jealously to their self-appointed roles as world policemen. Why do we not expect Germany to want to do the same in Europe as, historically, it has done?

The Europhiles argue that Europe is bonded by a common culture. That is a nice but ludicrous notion. Before even wondering what that culture may be, it pre-supposes that all Europeans share the same values and that no other nation can have those values. Not only does it ignore reality – does Bulgaria really have much in common with Sweden? – but it makes nonsense of a lot of foreign policy and international aid programmes of European Union members. Let us say, for instance, that “the rule of law” is a European value (though personally I would hold that it is an English value that has been adopted by many European countries). If no other country can become “European” (i.e. we don’t have the confidence that their cultural “mentality” permits them to understand what is being “European”), why bother to encourage other countries to adopt this particularly useful trait if they cannot be expected to understand it? If a non-European country adopted all these philosophical “European” ideas – as expressed in the laws of the European Union, I wager that those foisting on geographical Europeans the grand European dream will still deny that non-native Europeans can be ‘culturally European’. That is not only an arrogant conceit but it makes pointless the whole thrust of Europe’s foreign policy.

The very notion of a united Europe is based on a historic fallacy. It assumes some common classical Greco-Roman heritage for Europe but that ignores both history and common sense. Rome did not extend to the northern reaches of Europe – Scotland and Scandinavia – or throughout even the whole of the Germanic territories. And there were many other, even stronger, influences on some European countries where Rome did once have a presence (Arabic culture in Spain, say, or the Ottomans in Bulgaria).

Indeed, the notion of a superior European culture – Europe bonded by a common set of beliefs in equality and certain inviolable freedoms - is an exercise in collective amnesia. It conveniently blots out the blood-letting of the Balkan wars, not even a century ago, and the horrors of its colonial past, of the barbarities of the Belgians, the Germans, the Portuguese, the Spanish, the Italians and even, I regret to say, the British.

And then there was Nazi Germany (not to mention General Franco, Mussolini, the Greek Junta, Portugal’s Salazar, the communist legacy of the eastern European members – need I go on?). Nazi Germany was not a mere aberration that can be blanked out from the pages of history. In some senses, it was the culmination of the European dream – a united Europe where some of the more pernicious developments of ideas of the Enlightenment – euthanasia for instance - were put into evil practice. The lessons of a maniacal genocide have clearly still to be learned. The slow reaction of Europe to the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia is evidence of that.

Even religion does not form a common European bond. Ignoring the fact that for the most part of their history before the ‘barbarian’ invasions, the Romans were not Christian, Europe still bears the scars of deep fissures between (very broadly) a Protestant north, a Catholic west and south and an Orthodox east. And those divisions ignore all the local religions that existed before Christianity, religions that had such a strong hold on the popular imagination that their influence is so pervasive today that we barely notice it (consider the ‘pagan’ names we generally use for days of the week or names of the months or the religious festivals celebrated in Europe, such as Christmas, that are essentially ‘pagan’ holidays).

The various Christian sects, however, would not be a great barrier to the European dream, especially in an increasingly secular Europe, if it were not for language. For all its combined economic strength and population, Europe as an entity can never challenge the United States or even reach parity with it, because language will always form a barrier to the single market. This barrier becomes greater now that Germany is reunited. Labour is not as free to move about Europe as it is in the US, if only because of the language barrier (and that’s not the only barrier). The Germans will not surrender the language of Goethe, the French will not relinquish the language of Moliere and the British will no more give up the language of Shakespeare. Indeed, they will all compete to ensure their language is dominant.

And so I return to the basic question: does Europe have a future? I don’t see it. If Europe in the form of the European Union wanted to survive, it needed to do two things: prevent Germany reuniting; and not expand eastwards. In failing to do these two, the evolution of European power that was evident in the first half century since 1945 has taken an uncertain turn. Before, under the leadership of France and by its side a Germany wanting to atone for its recent past by opening its purse for others to dip in their sticky fingers, everyone knew their place. Margaret Thatcher may have rocked the boat but ultimately the UK was unimportant to the European dream.

Nations are born out of war. War binds their people together and creates a myth of nationhood and the spirit of a nation. The European Union has not had such a war. Should it face one, perhaps it will forge a sense of common purpose. But that eventuality seems unlikely. For the time being, the Benelux countries (and now the Balts and small central European states) will tend to favour the idea of a united Europe because it allows essentially bit players on the world stage to have a voice and recognition beyond their desserts. But, in time, the Germans will justifiably start to wonder why, with Europe’s strongest economy and, eventually, strongest military, it should be listening to these tiddlers. Europe beware.